Report into the London terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005 published
"Today the Prime Minister published the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005. "The Report concentrates on whether any intelligence, which may have helped prevent the attacks, was missed or overlooked; why the threat level was reduced and what impact this had; and what lessons need to be learned. "The Report breaks new ground in revealing information about the work of the intelligence Agencies. But police investigations continue into a number of issues touched on in the Report and some matters remain sub judice. For this reason we cannot reveal all of the detail of which we are aware, or comment on matters which are not in the Report. "In producing the Report, the Committee have taken evidence from a number of witnesses, including the heads of the security and intelligence Agencies, and examined a large number of Joint Intelligence Committee and Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre intelligence assessments and other intelligence reports. We have also taken evidence from members of the police and received information from officials in the Department of Transport. "The fact that the attacks were not prevented shows that there were - and are - clearly areas for improvement, but overall, the Committee have found that there were no culpable failures by the security and intelligence Agencies. "On the question as to whether any intelligence which may have helped prevent the attacks was missed or overlooked, we found that there was no prior warning from intelligence (domestic or foreign) of the plans to attack on 7 July. Prior to the attacks none of the four bombers had been identified by the intelligence and security Agencies as terrorist threats. However, having reviewed its record after the attacks, the Security Service found it had come across two of the bombers (Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer) prior to July on the peripheries of an earlier investigation. At the time they were unidentified. And there was no evidence that these two unidentified men were involved in attack planning against the UK. The decision not to give greater investigative priority to identifying these two individuals at the time was due to other investigations being prioritised, and we conclude that this decision was understandable. "On the reduction of the threat level prior to July we found that the decision to reduce the threat level from SEVERE GENERAL to SUBSTANTIAL was not unreasonable, on the basis of the intelligence available at the time. [There was no specific intelligence of the 7 July plot nor of any other group with a current credible plot.] SUBSTANTIAL continued to reflect a high level of threat and it was made clear that an attack might well be mounted without warning. "The Committee consider that the lowering of the country (UK) threat level is unlikely to have altered the alertness of responders (including the emergency services or to have affected the chances of preventing the 7 July attacks. However, the Committee has concerns that the threat level and alert systems are confusing. There must be clarity of the systems for public and practitioners: and there is a real need for the public to be better informed. We have recommended that the Government consider what can be said to the public about the level of threat and the alert state. "The Committee have concluded in the Report that lessons must be learned as a result of the 7 July attacks. Coverage of the threat, at home and abroad, must be increased - there must be greater capacity to follow more leads. The security and intelligence Agencies were already expanding prior to July, but post-July expansion plans must be accelerated and enhanced. And the Security Service programme of regionalisation must be expanded. The Agencies need a more proactive approach to identifying new leads if they are to build a better picture of extremist activity: the Security Service and police must work together better, to build a 'rich picture' of extremist activity at the local level, and Special Branches need to improve their counter terrorism capacity. "And a better understanding of radicalisation of British citizens is needed if effective strategies are to be developed to counter it. Neither the potential speed of radicalisation, nor the fact that British citizens could become radicalised to the point of suicide, were understood. The Committee are concerned that this could have had an impact on the ability of authorities to respond. "On these points we are assured that they are already being addressed and that lessons have been learned. "The Committee has concluded that greater coverage in Pakistan, or more resources generally in the UK, might have alerted the Agencies to the intentions of the 7 July group. It could be argued that better appreciation of the threat might have led Agencies to achieve a step change in capacity earlier - and it is now clear that there was room to do more, and to do it more quickly, than had been thought possible. But while greater resources for the Agencies mean a greater chance that attack planning will be identified, it is by no means guaranteed. "This is not just a domestic threat we are facing, but part of international terrorism. And the answer lies in successfully countering the spread of the Al Qaida message in the UK and overseas. But until that point, the efforts and successes of the Agencies in disrupting terrorist plots to harm the UK, are welcome. "It is tragic that they did not prevent the attacks on 7 July. We share the general horror and shock at the attacks and would like to take this opportunity to add our condolences to the families and friends of those killed, and sympathy to those injured, in these terrible attacks. We also extend our appreciation and gratitude to all those involved in the rescue and response effort." Copies of the Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (Cm 6785) can be purchased from TSO for £10.50. The report will also be made available on the ISC's web-site: http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/isc
•Date: 11th May 2006 • Region: UK• Type: Article •Topic: Terrorism |
