The changing nature of the bomb threat
The Spanish train bombs have again raised the immediate threat of terrorism, if it was not at the forefront following September 11th. As would be expected, contingency planning has been put to the front of the business agenda once again. The very nature of recent bombings has highlighted the pitfalls of some aspects of conventional contingency planning and has demonstrated the need for a rethink on security issues.
The solution After September 11th, many companies reassessed their security. Concrete bollards were put in place; car parks, that were too close to the building, were closed off; and water features were introduced. As medieval castles had moats as defence, so companies began to understand that to protect you had to keep the distance between you and your potential enemy. There should also be a difference between staff car parking and visitor car parking. It is easier to know your own staff than any visitor to the company, so visitor parking should be the furthest away from the building. Suicide bombers offer a different type of threat and it is difficult to protect against a determined attack using force, but obviously the main objective is to keep such forms of attack out of buildings and as far away as possible. Measures that could be put in place include perimeter security vehicle barriers and traffic calming measures to reduce vehicle speed. The most secure building is a bunker. Unfortunately we cannot all work from bunkers, we need to have light, and therefore we need glass. Glass is problematic. In most explosions, over 90 percent of injuries are caused by flying glass. All forms of glass perform differently in an explosion. The most hazardous is annealed glass, which was used in sixties-type domestic buildings. From there we progress to laminated glass, toughened glass, anti-shatter film, and a mind-boggling array of different glass treatments aimed at reducing the effects of a blast. The ideal situation is no glass at all, but a company needs a balanced solution, which is why it is better to leave this to the experts. Buildings need a strong enough skeleton to withstand the effects of a bomb blast. More modern buildings usually have a structural element able to ‘flex’ and accommodate the blast without collapse, although there may still be significant façade damage. Older buildings, made of stone or other load-bearing walls, cannot flex, having to absorb the entire blast impact. In the 1993 bombing of the City of London, St Ethelburga’s church collapsed after the load-bearing walls at the base were damaged, undermining the structural integrity of the entire building. Another example is the Grand Hotel, Brighton, where the bomb blast caused structural damage, resulting in collapse. When planning the layout of the building it is integral to put the core areas of the building in the centre, ideally with the corridors on the outside. The most valuable commodities should be approximately two-thirds the way up the building, as the bomb loses its force the greater the distance away from the blast. Open plan offices tend to be a ‘flimsy’ alternative to older, more robust buildings. Security advisors can be consulted to advise where walls should be reinforced and where secondary security walls should be built. One other option is the creation of a refuge area. Security experts can assess a building and designate an area within the building where people can be evacuated to in an alert. The danger is that in the panic people may inadvertently go into dangerous areas. When the IRA bombed Manchester in 1996 many did not know where the bomb site was and as a consequence did not know where to evacuate - it can be far safer to stay in a building where people are at less risk of flying glass and falling debris, than outside. Business continuity planning is vital. In the case of the London bombings of the nineties many banks found themselves in difficulty when both their main and back-up offices were in the same area, meaning that all data was lost. It is far better to ensure that your offices are in different locations, with the back up data not in too close vicinity to the original files. One merchant bank had its backup offices in the second World Trade Centre tower, but then again, the perceived risk at that time that both towers would succumb was almost non-existent. Ultimately it is all about expert risk assessment, and it is just as important for small businesses to have business continuity plans as for multinationals. With the terrorist threat on the doorstep, we can no longer cross our fingers and hope for the best. Chris Bowes is a director of the security
and counter-terrorism division of TPS Consult, which has advised
and worked on many of the most prominent public and defence buildings
in the UK, and on British Consulates and Embassies abroad.
•Date:
23rd March 2004 •Region: Various •Type:
Article •Topic: Terrorism |
