Crisis predication and effective decision-making models
What are the most important indicators of a potential crisis? In sound crisis management planning, organizations must be positioned to capture and examine nearly every out-of-the-ordinary indicator relevant to their enterprise. Is it simply a glitch in the flow of information, a case of bad luck, or the preliminary stages of a major disaster? Before contingency plans can be put into action, crisis situations must be accurately identified as such. Properly interpreting the indicators of a pending crisis is a variable dependant upon the specific business line. While a succession of port attacks to initiate a denial-of-service situation might not be an indicator of a crisis for some Department of Defense system networks; to a small, family operated, Internet-based business, this may certainly cause some alarm. It is not enough to capture potential indicators and warnings, there needs to be analysis. Many organizations already have existing signal detection mechanisms in place and they should be leveraged to better position the organization to respond. A sudden disruption in a critical supply chain source would certainly be noticed when the delivery trucks stopped showing up. On the other hand, is the organization monitoring the news headlines should members of the leadership of the parent company operating that chief supply source be under investigation for alleged fraudulent business practices? This could be a warning to be examined further. Discussions would include the best and worst case scenarios with alternatives to both, impacts upon secondary markets, and potential impact on the organization’s reputation. What is most important to know is the different value of signals in the prodromal stage (1) usually has different meanings to different organizations. There is one approach used during the assessment of situations, including war situations. The “dominant indicators approach” is a generalized organizational model that focuses on sudden and dramatic changes in the quantitative performance indicators as a determinate of how to respond. (2) There can be a full spectrum of reactions, from a major shift in organizational strategy to the decision to continue monitoring the desired indicators. The gain from this indicators process is that performance signals can be assessed a value that can in turn be modified from organization to organization. What is critical to one may be unimportant to the next. Research has proven this model of situational assessment is improved over other prediction models.(3) Perhaps the most important aspect is the empirically based analysis to weigh signals and determine subsequent courses of action. This model can even be applied to situational assessment of predicted weather conditions. An organization probably would not close a facility because of a 50 percent chance of rain. What if a category four hurricane is predicted to strike within twenty-four hours? While this is a very simplistic analysis, the empirical-based indicators (50 percent, category 4, 24-hours) would probably lead to a consideration of alternatives by the organization’s decision makers. To close this point, the most important indicators of a crisis may be in the application of quantitatively anchored indicators which very between disciplines and organizations. Successful crisis avoidance can simply be a matter of watching the numbers, assigning a meaning, and considering the alternatives ultimately not much different from other strategic organizational decision-making. How does rational choice affect strategic information overload? Among the various perspectives in the field of managerial decision-making is the interdisciplinary approach. Decision-makers draw liberally from the behavioral sciences and the quantitative disciplines. This integration of the sciences and disciplines occurs throughout several stages in the decision-making process. However, interlocking the concepts generally results in one part of the system being constrained by another part of the system. As such, this term plainly describes the concept of bounded rationality. (4) In bounded rationality, the decision-maker is constrained from obtaining optimal results by the boundaries of imperfect information, time and budget constraints, and human cognitive limitations (overload). To the crisis manager, these types of constraints are typical of the environment in which crisis action takes place. In addition, the decision-maker will further be constrained by the expectation that decisions rendered will have positive results in the achievement of attaining operational objectives or solving pressing problems. Again, to the crisis manager, this means the dynamics of an evolving crisis, coupled with constrains from a number of sources will probably result in less than optimal decisions. While the experienced crisis manger may realize this aspect, many times stakeholders do not. Research to identify the components of making decisions under pressure examined a common decision process, the critical decision model. The findings indicated crisis managers could describe the unselected courses of action, but actually had not taken the time to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the various options.(5) In short, it appeared crisis managers instead focused on assessing and classifying the situation they were facing. Once a recognizable incident was classified mentally, a programmed response was implemented. Generally, they would evaluate possible problems with implementing their preferred course of action. If envisioning a problem, efforts were spent figuring out how to make that course of action work. If the preferred course of action was unfeasible, only then would alterations to the plan be considered. This research is important because it crossed disciplinary boundaries having studied military commanders and intensive care nurses, further adding face validity to the notion that crisis managers will likely try to avoid information overload by bounding their rational to what they are familiar with. This does not always work however; particularly decision situations where an intuitive response rather than an analytical comparison or rational choice of alternative options is engaged. What was just described is the recognition-primed decision model; when crisis managers assess the situation to seek recognizable scenarios (through training and experience) with which a response is matched. Uncovered by considerable research into actual cases it was found incident commanders generally failed to recognize any framed decision-making process (assessing situation, considering alternative, weighing probabilities); Rather it was instinct being described as the proven method for selecting the best course of action. There is however, a very dangerous downside to the perception that experience is the single best source for emergency decisions. What happens during catastrophic or unique events never before experienced? The two best examples are the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers (2001) and the more recent terrorist besieging of the elementary school in Russia by Chechen extremist (2004). It can be argued that a formalized decision making template should be developed to avoid information overload during the most critical of incidents. Now however, the recognition-primed decision-making model appears to be the most effective. There is another model developed, the contingency model of decision-making, that may offer value to the crisis manager. Those factors around which the contingency model was developed were ambiguity, complexity, instability, accountability, and other constraints. Research into the contingency model has found much the same outcome as findings in the recognition-primed model. The significant characteristics of the successful decisions makers are knowledge (of command decision-making), ability (competence through experience), and motivation (desire to excel and succeed).(6) Regardless of which model a crisis manager chooses, characteristics of the decision task itself as well as those of the decision maker, do influence the act of choosing alternatives. That said, there are some generally applicable measures that crisis managers may be able to engage to counter the risk of information overload. In order to reduce constraints, emergency decision-makers can select satisfying options rather than driving for the optimal alternative is a good measure. The balancing of these two degrees would aid in reducing constraints. As a second measure, a focus on enhancing and improving existing options. This would mean reflecting on past experiences that worked and tailoring the alternatives to meet any new or unusual conditions. The primary concern with this measure however, is a risk of forcing the preferred choice into being the best choice, which may not be the case. Third, practice making decisions that blend options that are both rule-based (following rules and procedures) and knowledge-based (creative in nature). Tests, exercises, and additional research will help in finding balance in the use of rules-based and knowledge-based options. While these measures can help in improving the predominate model of crisis decision-making; nevertheless, there is a need for continued fundamental cognitive research to improve diversity in thinking, including a decision-making process with greater utility in hopes to avoid information overload during crisis actions. Author: Robert A. Young, CPP, CBRM, is the director, Office of Plans, Operations and Homeland Security, United States Capitol Police (USCP). The Congress chartered the USCP to protect its Members, staff, and visitors to the Capitol Campus. USCP also enables the continuity of the Legislative process. References (1) Fink, S. Crisis management: Planning for the inevitable. Los Angeles: Lexicon Communications. Fink describes the four stages of crisis as the prodromal (warning stage), chronic, acute and resolution stages.
•Date: 1st August 2008• Region: US/World •Type: Article •Topic: Crisis management |
