Business continuity lessons from Buncefield
The following provides a brief review of the business continuity themes contained within the recommendations of the Health and Safety Commission’s independent investigation into the explosions at the Buncefield Oil Depot in December 2005. Background At 06.01, the first explosion occurred, followed by further explosions and a large fire that engulfed over 20 large storage tanks. The main explosion event was centred on the car parks between the West side of the site and the Fuji and Northgate buildings. Significant damage occurred to both commercial and residential properties in the vicinity and a large area around the site was evacuated on emergency services advice. About 2000 people were evacuated. Sections of the M1 motorway were closed. The fire burned for several days, destroying most of the site and emitting large clouds of black smoke into the atmosphere, dispersing over southern England and beyond. Large quantities of foam and water were used to control the fire, with risks of contaminating water courses and ground water. Report * Assessing the potential for a major incident The off site implications are of particular interest as the incident at Buncefield provides a vivid example of the impact major accidents can have upon business continuity. The shear scale of the incident and its impact upon local, regional and national infrastructure meant that the repercussions were felt in many places. Within the report are many observations and comments relating to national and regional response arrangements which have to be implemented under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. A summary of the key points are included within this review. Thankfully the incident did not result in any fatalities and provided an excellent opportunity to learn lessons that have the potential for wider ranging consequences in the UK’s coordinated response to major incidents. Greater transparency and sharing of information pertaining to risk identification and analysis can all be seen as lessons from Buncefield. The following sections detail points that can be drawn out of the recommendations and should be seen as discussion points within current business continuity plans. Business continuity discussion points * Knowing your neighbours. The report calls for greater levels of information sharing particularly among emergency responders (Category One and Category Two responders within the Civil Contingencies Act). It is felt that the wider implications are that one needs to know the risks neighbours might have identified, to ensure plans account for all ‘credible’ hazards. * Back-to-normal vs. ‘social normality’. Within current business continuity advice (BS25999-1) the idea of returning to a state of normality post interruption focuses upon the resumption of business operations. The Buncefield recommendations focus upon the responsibility of local authorities to help communities back to social normality. The introduction of a social dimension could have an effect upon current business continuity plans. Often plans do not detail the range of social complexities that might actually be required to achieve ‘back-to-normal’ operations. * Increased communications. The report identifies the need to increase communication between local authorities and the local community to understand the ‘knock on’ effects of a major incident e.g. considering the closure of schools and hospitals, the failure of water and electricity supplies etc. This is linked to the return to social normality and should prompt a review of business continuity plans in terms of social complexity. * Resource contingencies. The response to a major incident may exhaust local resources and therefore contingencies should be planned in advance, in particular for critical resources. * Communication methods. The report raises the issue of how people are kept informed of the status of major incidents. Public methods of communication under consideration include a proposed BBC initiative ‘Communicating in a Crisis’. The implications are that organisations need clear policies and procedures for staff to follow within an emergency in their area to know who to call and gain guidance regarding an incident. * Dynamic recovery plans. Buncefield provides an excellent example of an incident where the length of recovery phase can be extended by external factors. The report calls for the introduction of special status to areas affected by major incident in order to relax planning regulations and facilitate regeneration. The lesson for business continuity is to be able to easily extend disaster recovery plans to accommodate any extension to the recovery phase. * Consider the wider environmental impacts. Because the scale of the incident the subsequent affects upon the environment had not been planned for in sufficient detail. Often environmental impacts, for instance those causing the denial of access to a building over a protracted period, can be dealt with by adapting the existing plan. However an organisation needs to be able to react dynamically. * Whilst focused on major hazard sites the report’s recommendations on having competent staff available 24/7 should not be ignored. The effective implementation of any plan requires personnel who can perform to the requirements of the plan and react to unplanned circumstances. Civil Contingencies Act Civil Contingencies Act discussion points * National coordination of major incidents and ministerial continuity. The report recommends that a lead government minister should be appointed to oversee the government’s input from response through recovery and the final closure of an incident. The report asks the government to clarify this recommendation. * It appears some operators ‘see the arrangements to comply with the CCA and with COMAH as being separate.’ (Para 33) * ‘The CCA framework…provides a valuable resource in preparing COMAH on and off-site emergency plans.’ (Para 33) * There is a need for technical and scientific specialists to liaise with the Strategic Control Group (SCG) within a major incident response structure. * The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government should lead the dissemination of lessons learned from responder’s reports. This includes reports such as the Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service report which is considered to have ‘widely applicable’ lessons. As previously mentioned the Buncefield incident offers an excellent example of a scale of incident unlike others in recent times and therefore provides an ideal case study from which to learn in terms of business continuity and the areas of the Civil Contingencies Act. Only by reflecting upon shared experiences and initiating discussion can people ensure plans continue to be effective when the need arises to put them into practice. References Recommendations on the emergency preparedness for, response to and recovery from incidents. Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board 2007 Civil Contingencies Act 2004: Part 1 Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 7: Communicating with the Public Cabinet Office 2004 Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service 2006 ISBN 978 0 11 703716 8 Authors
•Date: 1st August 2007• Region: World •Type: Article •Topic: BC general |
