A standardized local vs. national response: myths and misconceptions abound The walls of books around him, dense with the past, formed a kind of insulation against the present world and its disasters. Ross MacDonald For the large majority of those who helped design and implement the many phases of HSPD 5-Management of Domestic Incidents, HSPD 7-Critical Infrastructure Protection, HSPD 8 National Preparedness, and the National Response Plan (NRP), there is no debating the response issue. Whether it is a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina, industrial hazards, or a terrorist deployment of a weapon of mass destruction/effect (WMD/E), response is initiated and managed at the local level. Looking back, within four days after the multiple aerial attacks on 9/11, the President issued Proclamation 7463 to declare a state of national emergency. By doing so, the President made available to himself a constitutional emergency authority. This authority facilitated the reapportion of national funds, postponed officer personnel laws, wavered strength limitations, ordered up the military Ready Reserve back to active duty, including the United States Coast Guard Officers on the retired list back to active duty. However, the potentially devastating effects of a Category 3 hurricane like Katrina was no comparison to the 9/11 surprise attacks. Whether the situation is a natural disaster or an attack on the United States, balancing the authorities and responsibilities of a national response, does not rest entirely on the shoulders of the President. States have the responsibility and authority to preempt or limit the effects of an event and respond to protect lives and property, and mitigate human suffering without an order from the President. In fact, the public officials in New Orleans had at least a week to prepare for the hurricane, using their local and state continuity of operations plans (COOP). They also had 72 hours to posture themselves for a more satisfactory local, state, and regional response. More remarkable, is that they had access to decades of hurricane data for the Gulf of Mexico Region. More importantly, major metropolitan areas (MMAs) are responsible for hazard mitigation planning and reduction. Therefore, estimating the possible impacts and catastrophic effects was at its best “Textbook” to include the possibility of a major evacuation and manpower needed to manage civil unrest. These are basic planning assumptions embedded in any emergency management comprehensive planning baseline. As a point of reference, read scenario #10-Natural Disaster, Major Hurricane, of the 15 National Planning Scenarios—it invariability matches the impact results of Hurricane Katrina. Given these facts, there was no immediate need for the President of the United States to intervene in a state’s sovereign duty and responsibility to protect the public, the economic importance of a region, and to fully initiate its comprehensive family of disaster plans, business continuity, continuity of operations and government plans. On the contrary, each state has in its own right the appropriate public laws, policies, funds, and resources to mount a response and manage the situation for a substantial time. The state of Louisiana has had ample time to follow other neighboring states lead in hurricane preparedness. These states are some of the benchmarks in emergency management planning and much could be learned from their programs and community outreach for the special needs population. Therefore, planning the response should be relatively simple and the roles of each state and local team member, decision maker, and technical expert equally less complex as in the local, state, and regional response to Hurricane Katrina. Planning the response: deciding to manage the incident or manage the consequences …carefully detailed plans and weighty expectations, are like an overloaded plane, it never manages to get off the ground. The Art of Leadership, J. Donald Walters First and foremost, if all reports are correct concerning the Mayor of New Orleans absence, it was beyond belief to hear that any Mayor would leave his/her post for a substantial period of time during any major phase of a disaster. According to many reliable reports and articles the Mayor of New Orleans was in Texas during the most critical moments of Hurricane Katrina. In every disaster, the degrees of involvement (locally, regionally, and nationally) will vary in the initial response phases, but most importantly, the involvement of elected local government officials, and public servants, all of whom are mission essential personnel once the disaster starts. It is important to remember, that they took an oath and/or decree to be ready and vigilant in their assumed duties upon taking office. One of the many requirements during the disaster and after includes the development of a post-disaster hazard mitigation plan. This plan is a major requirement of Subpart M to 44 CFR Part 206 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended) which was requested with the first 72 hours of Hurricane Katrina reaching land. Looking more closely at the first 72 hours, the casual outside observer might feel it is safe to presume that the response should be nothing more than textbook protocol. 72 Hour Disaster Time Line: Saturday August 27, 2005 Sunday August 28, 2005 Monday August 29, 2005 An important aspect about the Stafford Act declaration is that the State Governor(s) of Mississippi and Louisiana asserted to the President that certain conditions have been met; primarily that the Governors certified that one or more of their states at this point in the disaster lack the personnel and resources required to sufficiently mount an effective response without Federal assistance. According to the above 72 hour disaster time line, it might have been too premature to make such an issuance so early in the disaster. Theoretically, exposing your states shortcomings this early in the disaster should be impossible, unless either of the states never sufficiently corrected previous discrepancies from hurricanes or past disasters. This is an important note, since one of the mandates and requirements when implementing the request for Federal assistance is correcting your deficiencies. According to Sec. 409 of 44 CFR Emergency Management and Assistance: As a condition of any disaster loan or grant made under the provisions of this Act the recipient shall agree that any repair or construction to be financed therewith shall be in accordance with applicable standards of safety, decency, and sanitation and in conformity with applicable codes, specifications, and standards, and shall furnish such evidence or compliance with this section as may be required by regulation. As a further condition of any loan or grant made under the provisions of this Act, the State or local government shall agree that the natural hazards in the areas in which the proceeds of the grants or loans are to be used shall be evaluated and appropriate action shall be taken to mitigate such hazards, including safe land use and construction practices, in accordance with standards prescribed or approved by the President after adequate consultation with the appropriate elected officials or general purpose local governments, and the State shall furnish such evidence of compliance with this section as may be required by regulation. If either state had asked for funding assistance in the past, one of the minimum standards would have been to repair or replace the affected area to bring it up to applicable codes and standards ensuring that the structures are better able to withstand similar impact in the future. It’s important to note, that there is a minimum 12 years of documented history taken by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) pertaining to disaster preparedness and assistance. More specially, from 1982-1994, there are numerous reports on the State of Louisiana (levee issues, Disaster Assistance Request, and the high risk associated with developing the to the barrier islands.) After a careful review of these GAO reports, it would be worthwhile for the general public and first responder organizations, to request a detailed look at the provisions of each state’s Stafford Act submissions, plans, after actions reports, and emergency management spending to ensure the American public knows how unprepared either state was prior to the Hurricane Katrina or any other previous disaster. This might be an appropriate commission for the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General’s Office to undertake; provide the American public, business owners, and industry a thorough report on the risks associated with their states past and present resolutions to Section 409 preparedness, response, and recovery measures. Predicting the unpredictable: disastrous cascading effects Katrina was in the cards, forewarned, foreseen and yet still dismissed. That so many officials were caught so unprepared was a failure less of imagination than will. Nancy Gibbs, TIME magazine Sept 12, 2005 When America’s adversaries start seeing opportunities in our symptomatic disaster preparedness and response infrastructure, our nation has a more serious problem. According to an article posted on www.albawaba.com, (Hurricane Katrina: Al Qaeda leader in Iraq sees ‘start of US collapse’; Kuwait sends US$500m aid) terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi said on August 29; that the devastation caused by Katrina is the start of US collapse. Granted the nation as a whole is spending well over an estimated $1.5 billion dollars a day to correct New Orleans elected officials’ costly mistakes. The general public can only hope that the President of these United States will not allow our nation to go bankrupt due to any states indiscriminate negligence in disaster preparedness. Nevertheless, this responsibility does not just rest on the President’s shoulders; it is equally the public’s and the first responder community’s responsibility to be involved. The only way our communities can assure themselves in the future that these types of blunders never happen to them, is to get involved with their local and state emergency preparedness committees. After all, it is within their right to know their communities’ level of preparedness. Now more than ever, a more rigorous national planning and resource requirements oversight is required. Each state should not have to be coerced to participate in national preparedness e.g. leading state officials in the right direction using the ploy of the carrot and the stick. On a brighter note, the Department of Homeland Security has developed an all-hazards National Preparedness Goal, accompanied by other related approaches, implementation plans, and requirements to support Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 – National Preparedness. In addition, this movement towards national preparedness will be equality important for National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13, which addresses maritime security. Implementing these policy strategies will require the appropriate dedication and execution by all partners involved. These policies will provide opportunities for communities across the nation to develop strategies for reduction further potential losses form future natural disasters or terrorist attacks. Ashley P. Moore, CBRNE-D Technical Director, Anteon Corporation. Prometheusllc@adelphia.net
•Date: 7th October 2005 •Region: US •Type:
Article •Topic: Emergency planning |
