|
Zophar
Santé discusses the security issues that companies must consider
as they migrate to IP SANs for data backup and storage.
As the need for information storage and backup
continues to rise exponentially, many companies have migrated away
from Fibre Channel SANs and NAS and begun investigating and implementing
cost-effective IP SANs. IP SANs are storage networks connected over
IP networks with information packets being sent within a SCSI command
between an iSCSI initiator and iSCSI target. The average company
has an IP-based infrastructure already in place and established
IT guidelines, making the implementation of an IP SAN easy and affordable.
However, because IP SANs may use the Internet,
some companies hesitate. “Send my confidential company information
via the Internet?” “Is it secure?” “How
do I know that the right people will get the right information?”
“How do I identify the right people?” These are legitimate
questions that some insight into the available Internet, iSCSI and
SAN technologies can answer.
An IP SAN includes four layers:
* LAN perimeter
* Inter-LAN communications
* Initiator authorisation
* Initiator authentication
IP SAN security is not left to any single layer,
as an iSCSI command makes its way through each layer. How to protect
them is the question.
Overview of an IP SAN
An IP SAN has three main types of components: storage devices, hosts
and switches. The storage devices and hosts sit at opposite ends
of the SAN and are connected in the middle through the IP network
switches. iSCSI initiators in the host connect through the IP switch
to iSCSI targets in the storage devices to access information.
IP SAN-enabling products – software,
hardware or a combination – deliver virtualisation of physical
storage into customised, sizable virtual volumes. Virtualisation
can increase security in an IP SAN by enabling unique partitioning
of physical storage and applying rules for access to each partition.
Intelligent IP SAN switches sit in the data path between the storage
devices and the IP network switch.
The LAN perimeter
The first layer of protection in an IP SAN is the wall separating
the internal network or local area network (LAN) from the outside
networks. This wall is the gateway through which information enters
and leaves the LAN. Controlling this perimeter controls information
access and flow.
A firewall usually sits on the perimeter between
the internal and external networks. A firewall provides traffic
control between these two networks. A firewall can be closed to
stop all traffic flow or selectively opened at specific locations
to allow specific IP traffic through.
The iSCSI initiator login attempt trying to
pass through the firewall must be on the firewall’s list of
IPs allowed to cross the firewall. If it is, it also must enter
through correct port and be of the correct protocol. All firewalls
should also have some method for authentication.
The switch supports alternate iSCSI communication
port configurations. A port other than the standard iSCSI port can
be used for iSCSI communications, making unauthorised login attempts
harder.
Inter-LAN communications
If a LAN is closed to outside networks, information will be more
secure. However, most companies need to be connected to outside
networks. Isolation isn’t an option.
When information crosses through the private/public
border, it can lose the security it enjoyed in a LAN. One cannot
build a wall around information as it travels between networks.
However, it is possible to create secure tunnels, and safeguard
the information during its journey.
A virtual private network (VPN) creates a secure
transport tunnel for data in motion between two LANs using high-level
encryption. A VPN appliance is placed at the public/private border
of each LAN. Encryption keys and groups are then configured for
point-to-point encryption decoding to guard against eavesdropping.
When the iSCSI initiator login attempt passes
through the firewall and travels to another LAN, it is encrypted
by the VPN as it leaves its LAN and is decoded by the VPN at the
entrance to the second LAN.
Intelligent IP SAN switches support VPN tunnelling
appliances and methods, allowing information flowing through the
switch to be encrypted during ‘public’ travel between
LANs.
The iSCSI initiator login attempt that made
it successfully through the firewall arrives securely to the switch’s
LAN.
iSCSI initiator authorisation
So far, security measures have taken place in two layers of your
IP SAN. An iSCSI initiator login attempt has qualified for access
at each network layer. It is now at the specific iSCSI target device.
Does the device allow anyone who can find it to log in? At this
point, each device is on its own.
Certain devices support the creation of an
access control list (ACL) for a target to establish which iSCSI
initiators are allowed or denied access to it. Besides determining
which iSCSI initiators can access the device, the type of access
can also be set; to read-write or read-only.
At the switch layer, ACL configurations are
supported on a per-target per-initiator basis. The switch ACL uses
the iSCSI initiator’s WWUI (world wide unique identifier)
to identify it. More than one initiator can be allowed access to
a target and each initiator’s access rights can be independently
configured. Access to a target can also be denied to an iSCSI initiator.
iSCSI initiator authentication
An iSCSI initiator login attempt seems to come from an ACL-approved
source. But how do we know that the iSCSI initiator really is who
it says it is? How do we know it isn’t an impostor? What if
our club – the iSCSI target – has a secret handshake
that all members need to know to gain admittance? Something more
elaborate and foolproof than “I know Dave.”
Challenge-handshake authentication protocol
(CHAP) is an authentication protocol that can be used to authenticate
iSCSI initiators at target login. The iSCSI target server sends
an encrypted user name and password challenge to the initiator.
The initiator must answer the challenge. Without the correct answer,
the iSCSI session login attempt is terminated.
The IP SAN switch ACL supports CHAP and SRP
authentication for its iSCSI targets. The user name and password
are configured and stored on the switch. As an additional safety
measure, the switch includes a RADIUS client for supporting a RADIUS
server. Instead of storing the user name and password together on
the switch, the user password can be stored on the RADIUS server.
IP SANs answer the growing need for more cost-effective
and secure SAN implementations. Using readily available IP security
technologies, data transfer over the IP network is secure without
increasing the cost of ownership of an IP SAN. IP SAN switches add
initiator authorisation and authentication to your existing security
measures.
IP Security encryption technologies are due
to be incorporated into next-generation intelligent switches to
provide for full data encryption within the LAN. Additionally, look
to future switches including technologies to protect your data even
against theft of the physical storage disks.
Zophar Santé is VP market development,
SANRAD, Incorporated
www.SANRAD.com

•Date:
31st August 2004 •Region: Worldwide •Type:
Article •Topic: IT
continuity
Rate this article or
make a comment - click
here
|